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TOP MANAGEMENT PAY: 
IMPACT of  (C)OVERT POWER  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines variations in executive compensation as a function of CEO 
power.   We assume that a CEO’s motivation to optimize his pay is conditional 
upon his ability to shape decisions that favor his interests. Power is inferred form 
overt manifestations such as share holdings, but also from covert sources such as  a 
CEO’s social capital. Two components of compensation are considered: base pay 
and bonus. While financial performance, firm size, and other factors are held 
constant, the results show  overt power as measured by CEO, and CEO-family 
equity holdings, to have a curvilinear relationship with executive compensation. 
Proxies of covert power include tenure, being (one of) the founder(s) and firm 
diversification. These variables magnify or moderate  the effect of equity holdings 
on compensation. The power effects are most pronounced for the size of CEO 
bonus. 
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TOP MANAGEMENT PAY: 
IMPACT of  (C)OVERT POWER  
 
      
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
     Despite his diminishing share of the company-some 
     11 percent-Paley acted the omnipotent owner 
     (from In All His Glory: The Life of William S. Paley, 
     Smith, 1990) 
 
 It is often thought that ownership wields power, in particular if the owner is also a 
manager in the firm. Then the voting power from shareholdings is magnified by 
having a position in the firm, and the manager can use the implied power shape 
strategic decisions, and serve his personal goals. This paper looks at one particular 
application of such power: of its impact on the manager's own compensation (i.e., 
salary, bonus).   
 A key insight of the paper will be that manager-owners do not have power 
automatically. Rather, their power depends on their entrenchment in the firm, and on 
the social relationships they have built up over the years with relevant parties (e.g., 
directors in the firm, other managers, suppliers, etc.  Embeddedness will increase their 
power to serve their own goals; for instance, to manipulate their salary and bonus. 
This paper develops this key insight further and derives various testable implications 
by examining data on 143 top executives in medium-sized firms in the Netherlands. 
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Background 
 
The major theoretical framework for researching CEO pay comes from economics 
and has been captured by the notion of agency theory. The CEO as agent performs the 
role of maximizing the value of the shareholders, i.e. the principal. With the 
separation of ownership and control, there is often the potential problem that the 
interests of the manager and owners do not converge, and so called agency problems 
ensue. For example, the stockholders might lack full oversight on the conduct and 
performance of the CEO. Likewise, the CEO might be motivated to make decisions 
that conflict with the shareholders' best interests (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
fact, a classic idea in agency theory is that manager incentives are optimal when the 
manager is the full owner of the firm as this manager bears the full pecuniary 
consequences of his actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When he is partial owner, 
there is the potential for divergence in interest between owners and managers. The 
partial ownership might confer power, and substantial leverage to manipulate 
compensation, although the CEO might no longer operate under conditions in which 
he will maximize shareholder value. The CEO might also enjoy other sources of 
power, including visible as well as more stealthy ones due to the recruitment and 
retention of lesser team members; again these sources of power might be exploited to 
maximize CEO, rather than shareholder interests.  Within the agency literature, issues 
of politics  and power are never considered, perhaps because such sources of 
aberration should be dealt with by optimizing  the design of compensation plans.  
 Our paper explores whether such political behaviors do indeed occur, focusing 
on the executives' salaries and bonuses. Moreover, we explore how top managers use 
their holdings to manipulate their pay, and how this conspicuous form of power 
interacts with other surreptitious sources of power.  
We should recognize that power is a concept that far exceeds the presumption 
of coercion, or even the imposition of will despite resistance (e.g., Blau, 1964). At 
most, coercion is one of many sources of power as an early paper by French and 
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Raven(1959) suggested. Whenever the direction of dependence between a CEO and 
other power holders is shaped by an imbalance of power sources, we should define 
the exercise of power independently from these sources (e.g., Hickson et al., 1971). If 
a CEO’s exercise of power is discernible from the determination of CEO 
compensation, any overt or covert source of power might be at stake. These sources 
include his ownership holdings, but also his tenure and other precedent or norm 
setting opportunities. All sources of power may enter into the determination of top 
management pay.  
 Some writers in agency theory have recognized that power is a relevant factor 
regarding top management pay. Jensen and Murphy (1990) explicitly referred to 
power, within and outside corporations, as a determinant of CEO pay. They argued, 
for example, that the public outcry over large bonuses and other financial rewards for 
CEOs has prevented efficient contracts that would ensure strong pay-performance 
relationships. Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggested that 
executives make all kinds of effort to augment their pay, which in fact, may weaken 
the actual impact of corporate performance. Yet, agency theorists have not tried to 
open up the black box of the firm, for example, regarding how managers use their hol-
dings to manipulate their pay. There is, however an extensive body of organizational 
literature that has begun to explore these issues. 
 
Management studies 
Management researchers have long been aware of the power of the CEO vis-a-vis the 
boards of directors. As the firm's central decision maker, the CEO represents the 
nerve center where many communication lines intersect. He connects many networks 
with non-redundant information and enjoys, therefore, an informational advantage 
with respect to his associates with whom he shares strategic and operational 
responsibility. Various writers have emphasized that CEOs play a central role in 
recruiting and selecting board members, determining the compensation of directors 
and influencing the agenda of board meetings This is because the board functions on 
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information supplied by the CEO (Galbraith, 1967; Mace, 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1980; Aram and Cowen, 1983; Geneen, 1984; Pierce and Zahra, 1991; Boyd, 1991, 
1994). 
 The power of top managers may vary with who owns the firm, which in turn 
may affect top management pay. McEachern (1975) classified firms as 1) owner 
managed, those for which ownership was concentrated among its executives; 2) 
management controlled, for which ownership was dispersed among many sharehol-
ders; and 3) externally controlled, for which ownership was concentrated among a 
few individuals who did not manage the firm. Managers in externally controlled firms 
were expected to have little influence on their pay. Consistent with predictions, 
McEachern found that the cash pay (salary plus bonus) of these top managers was 
more strongly tied to the firm's profit and market value than for managers in the other 
two types of firms.  
 McEachern's seminal study triggered other studies comparing management 
controlled firms with externally controlled firms - owner managed firms remained 
relatively unexplored. These studies confirmed McEachern's result that pay-perfor-
mance relationships for managers in externally controlled firms were stronger than in 
management controlled firms (see e.g., Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989, 1994; Wade et 
al., 1990). 
 These studies also analyzed covert sources of CEO power, usually tenure. 
CEOs and existing board members were expected to develop social exchange rela-
tions over time, with the CEO being central to recruitment and compensating of new 
directors. Top executives with longer tenure were expected to have accumulated more 
power, and to be more successful in manipulating their pay. The evidence was mixed. 
Significant positive relationships were found between tenure and pay elements such 
as salary, bonus, and incidence of golden parachutes (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Hill 
and Phan, 1991), but also insignificant relationships were found (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1989; O'Reilly et al., 1990), and even significant negative relationships 
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(Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Wade et al., 1990). Still others found non-linear relations 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Gerhard and Milkovich, 1990).  
 For example, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) found no support for the 
positive relationship between tenure and pay predicted in their study. Further 
exploration revealed that total cash compensation first increased in tenure, but then 
decreased (an inverted U-shape)1.  The authors argued that their result was consistent 
with 1) a power-based argument, i.e., that power accrues initially, followed by a pla-
teauing and decline as the CEO transforms into a figurehead while potential 
successors emerge; or 2) a life cycle-based argument, i.e., that income and spending 
life style change with advancing age, and CEOs are willing to shift their compensati-
on toward a more risky profile, away from cash compensation. Subsequent analysis 
showed that older executives own larger share holdings, which might fit the second 
interpretation. 
 Only a few studies analyzed the power of top managers in family owned firms 
(owned by the manager or his family). Allen (1981) expected these managers to be 
more powerful than managers in other firms, and more successful in augmenting their 
pay. Contrary to this prediction, he found that the direct pay (salary, bonus, deferred 
compensation) of CEOs was lower in family owned firms, although the aggregate pay 
of these CEOs (including dividends) was higher. Allen also found that family control 
was not only rooted in equity holdings, but also in more covert forms of power, 
allowing families to control the firm even if 1% or less of the shares remains within 
the family. Yet, Allen did not dis-entangle overt and covert power in affecting top 
management pay. 
 Finally, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) predicted that top management pay 
first increases in proportion to their holdings, and then decreases. It first increases 
because top managers use their power to reap money from the firm, at the expense of 
                                                 
1  However, Finkelstein did not find this pattern for the separate elements salary and 
bonus. 
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other shareholders. For higher levels of holdings, it becomes more attractive to leave 
money in the firm. In the US, personal capital gains historically have been taxed at a 
far lower rate than earned income. The smaller the proportional claims of others on 
the firm's capital gains, the more attractive it becomes for the manager to leave money 
in the firm. Hence, the predicted curvilinear relation (inverted U-shape). 
 In addition to the manager's own holdings, Finkelstein and Hambrick argued, 
that the holdings of other members of the CEO's family also provide him power. 
Moreover, family shareholders may not be as vigilant as independent directors, and 
the executive may have a freer hand in setting his pay. However, their evidence from 
a sample of firms from the leisure industry was mixed. Consistent with predictions, a 
curvilinear relationship (inverted U-shape) was found between CEO holdings and 
salary, but insignificant relationships were obtained between CEO holdings and bonus 
and with total cash compensation (salary + bonus). Their results involving holdings of 
the family (excluding the CEO) contradicted their hypotheses. The authors attributed 
the lack of support to the idiosyncratic nature of their sample. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
These observations can now be summed up into a simple framework that is anchored in a 
political theory of organization. We start from the assumption that incentive systems are 
designed to induce a CEO to make decisions that are compatible  with the interest of the 
residual claimants. However, CEOs often have access to sources of power that allow them 
to manipulate their pay at the expense of residual claimants. 
 We distinguish two sources of power: overt and covert. Overt power is inferred 
from the CEO's equity holdings, with the presumption that the greater these holdings, the 
better his ability to manipulate his pay. At higher levels of equity holdings, CEO inferred 
power is even more ostentatious, but the drive to reap more compensation declines and 
eventually disappears altogether, due to the diminishing wealth transfer from external 
equity holdings to the executive. This  tendency is further bolstered by  the reduced tax 
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liability if funds remain in the firm compared with funds becoming part of the CEO's pay 
out. The implied curvilinear relationship between equity holdings and pay is consistent 
with recent modifications of agency based studies such as the one by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) regarding compensation and equity 
holdings.  However, equity holdings alone are not a sufficient condition for executive pay. 
It is also necessary for CEOs to have access to indigenous sources of power. That access 
can be inferred from their embeddedness in the upper echelons of the firm. The CEO is the 
primes inter pares, and particularly when he complements his financial assets in the firm 
with “social assets” and  other out-of-sight sources, he has at least the discretion to sway 
compensation decisions. Since we can assume that self interest is ubiquitous, we should 
indeed expect him to do so. 
 The formal position of the CEO, in conjunction with indications of stock 
ownership do not exhaust the sources of power that a CEO enjoys. While formal 
authority as a manifestation of overt power, deriving form the position of chief 
financial officer matters, we should recognize that power comes also from other 
sources. Such sources include the ties ones has with powerful others. Managers are 
often endowed with coalitions of support. They have cultivated ties  through their 
promotion and hiring decisions, followed by granting favors to those who have 
become part of his governance landscape. Such alliances  are thus the result from 
having assigned people in critical positions, as well as having granted favors to them 
such that their support can be relied upon. It allows him to capitalize on the norm of 
reciprocity, which “ says that we are obligated to future repayments of favors, gifts, 
invitations” (Pfeffer, 1992: 106). Such a norm facilitates exchange relationships 
among individuals across time. The favors are not necessarily sought, nor are they 
specified in any formal sense, but rather the favor creates a diffuse, generalized 
commitment (Pfeffer, 1992).  The implication is that a manager who has entrenched 
himself in a self-compiled network of people and groups faces numerous obligations, 
but likewise, can count on reciprocity in matters that are important to the CEO, 
including his compensation package. When he is the firm’s founder he commands a 
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particularly advantageous position in creating a network of exchange relationships 
that suits his interests; he starts with a clean slate.  When he succeeds the old guard, 
including a founder, he requires some time to undo his predecessor’s governance 
arrangements--an undoing that improves with tenure.   
 Furthermore, tenure institutionalizes exchange relationships, makes them 
durable attributes of the governance structure. With time, the CEO is in a position to 
modify old practices and to set precedents for new ones which his fellow-managers  
begin to accept automatically. The duration on the job will likewise embellish the 
CEO’s reputation which further solidifies his legitimacy to set precedents. Tenure 
promotes the  standardization of new decision making protocols and the practices of 
the CEO’s team become taken-for-granted. New additions to the board, or to the top 
management team are bound to conform to such practices, thus facilitating the 
preservation of informal control that the CEO already accumulated.   
 Tenure renders the CEO also increasingly as the most central person in a 
communication network. The persons who surround him will inevitable occupy more 
peripheral positions. With growing tenure, chances are that peripheral individuals are 
relatively recent additions to the network. They are often added at the behest of the 
CEO, thus reinforcing his centrality in the communication network which include his 
immediate associates, such as board members and senior officers.  There is ample 
evidence that those individuals with central positions in a communication network do 
not only enjoy more power (e.g., Krackhard (1990) , but can also affect salary and 
other economic returns (Pfeffer and Konrad (1991) found that individuals who had 
more extensive communication with peers in other institutions enjoyed higher 
salaries.  
The CEO's embeddedness renders him, therefore, constrained by commitments, 
side payments and other obligations. His social network obliges him. Yet,  he can be 
expected to relish more discretion than others. As first among equals he enjoys a 
privileged position, especially if he can bolster this with equity holdings.  Tenure and 
other aspects of his incumbency will further embellish his status as first among equals. In 
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the course of his tenure, or endowed with the status as (one of) the founders, he enjoys 
surplus leverage over others who might have to ratify his decisions. Tenure, for example, 
will be associated with the growing size of gifts that are typically exchanged among 
socially connected individuals (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1974). Some CEOs,  therefore, have 
access to a repertoire of  social means to mold the outcomes of decisions that affect them 
personally. In short, such executives will subvert the potentially confining embeddedness, 
and  exact surplus rents. 
 The obligations that are manifest in a network of social relationships are 
confounded by the control of resources that the actors command.  Among the most 
salient resources are those that revolve around information and knowledge. Tenure in 
its own right will already confer such control because with time, the CEO learns and 
acquires an informational benefit vis a vis others. When he manages a strategically 
diversified firm he enjoys the potential of even greater information compactedness 
that he can readily bring into his performance-compensation condition. The 
implication is that under complex, strategically diverse conditions, the CEO can wield 
more informal power. In contrast, in single business firms, for example a product-
market that is confined to a single industry category, information asymmetries are 
much less likely to surface as such firms can be assumed to be more “transparent.”  
 It is, therefore, argued that CEO compensation correspondingly reflects the joint 
effects of his overt and covert sources of power. It is the bringing together of this subtle 
process of covert with overt power, i.e., equity holdings, that sets this paper apart from the 
recent contributions in financial economics regarding agency and equity holdings.  
 
Salary and Bonus 
 We test a number of hypotheses  (separately for salary and bonus ) that are based 
on this framework. Salary and bonuses seem to serve different functions regarding top 
management pay, with bonuses more related to short-term accounting performance, and 
salary to job complexity of the executive (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Gerhard and 
Milkovich, 1990). Job complexity is usually measured in terms of firm sales and/or 
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employees. Furthermore, we expect job complexity to be related to firm diversity, with job 
complexity being highest at intermediate levels of diversification. Therefore, we expect 
relatively high salaries for these executives, reflecting their relatively high marginal 
products. Furthermore, we expect that individual performance of these executives is 
difficult to measure, hence we expect fixed pay to be relatively more important as part of 
their pay mix. The results in Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) and Gomez-Mejia (1992) 
are consistent with this complexity  interpretation. 
 From the perspective of the firm, fixed and variable pay perform different 
functions. Salary tends to be invariant with respect to performance, while bonuses and 
other forms of variable pay enable the firm to closely tie compensation to individual and 
corporate performance. For managers, a dollar of bonus equals a dollar of salary as they 
both increase managerial wealth. Therefore, we expect executives to leverage in order to 
manipulate salaries in essentially the same fashion as they manipulate bonuses. First, the 
risk of the two forms of pay vary considerably. Salary is semi-fixed, meaning that a salary 
increase at t1 positively affects salaries at t2, t3,  etc. Bonuses are more volatile. For 
example, bonuses often depend on firm annual or quarterly performance, that in turn 
hinges on many factors beyond an executive's control, including business cycles, 
competitors' conduct, environmental jolts, as well as by the members of his management 
team. Therefore, all things being equal, risk averse executives  would favor salary over 
bonuses discernible. 
 Second, it is well known that salaries increase at more or less fixed proportions 
with increasing hierarchical levels (Simon, 1957; Mahoney, 1979). The cost of increasing 
top management salary for the firm, and hence for the executive as (partial) owner, may be 
magnified, since increasing his own salary generates a concomitant upward pressure on 
lower level salaries. The net effect of these two factors may be positive or negative. That 
is, it is an empirical matter whether salary is more amenable or susceptible to executive 
manipulation than are  bonuses. On balance, however, analogous to our  interpretation on 
bonuses, we expect that top executives use their equity holdings and family holdings to 
similarly manipulate their salaries. 
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Hypotheses 
 
 
We expect that executives will leverage their share holdings to circumvent the impact of 
performance on compensation., i.e., they will use their holdings to "manage" the pay-
performance connection. 
 In practice, compensation committees seldom cast their votes in proportion to their 
members' equity holdings. The top executive may not even be a member of the 
compensation committee, and in publicly held firms he is barred from joining them. 
Equity holdings in itself do not seem a sufficient condition for influencing pay. Rather, we 
expect the process to be more subtle, where the actual (as opposed to potential) power 
from share holdings is contingent on CEO covert sources of power, that is, on his "social 
capital" (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wade et al., 1990). Such capital is anchored in the 
social networks that executives have built around themselves (Burt, 1992). A CEO who 
has assembled a set of contacts is endowed with information which confer what Burt 
(1992) calls "structural autonomy". These contacts, both within and outside the firm, and 
the superior information that CEOs derive from these contacts, can be instrumental for the 
shaping of his pay mix, and, in particular, for manipulating the size of his bonus.  Such 
social capital, as indicated by interlocking directorates, and "ties" with firms having 
golden parachutes has shown to be a key factor in a firm's propensity to adopt golden 
parachutes (Davis, 1991).  
 On average, executives with share holdings are likely have some covert power. 
Thus, we expect a CEO with share holdings to manipulate his bonus and salary. For 
reasons mentioned earlier, the relationship is curvilinear. This prediction is identical to 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), who find no support for their prediction, which is 
attributed to the idiosyncrasies of their sample from the leisure industry. This study will 
test the hypothesis on multiple industry data.  
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H1.1: Bonus and salary have a curvilinear relationship (inverted U-shape) 
with CEO equity holdings. 
 Executives may not only leverage their equity holdings, but might also act so on 
the basis of their family holdings. In most societies, relationships among relatives are 
governed by strong reciprocity norms. Strong social exchange relationships (Homans, 
1961; Blau, 1964) may exist between the executive and his relatives, where an executive 
exchanges support, affection and respect for continued tenure.2  In fact, social exchange 
covenants between family members may be more important than virtually any other 
exchange relation in society. Family holdings and family controlled firms are among the 
ones that appear immune to the market for corporate control (e.g., Davis and Stout, 1992),  
the implication being that such firms have a more discretionary governance. 
  However, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) did not find support for their 
prediction that an executive's bonus has a curvilinear relationship (inverted U-shape) with 
family holdings (excluding that of the executive), which they attribute to the 
idiosyncrasies of the sample. An alternative, plausible explanation is that family holdings 
will likely correlate with CEO holdings  (because children, grandchildren, etc., of the 
founder share the heritage). Suppose executives do indeed serve the interests of them-
selves and their family, rather than focusing myopically on their own interest, and that the 
relationship between bonus and share holdings is indeed non-linear (inverted U-shape). 
Then, for example, an executive with 30% equity in the firm, whose other family members 
own 35%, will regard 65% rather than 35 % as the relevant percentage. This may induce 
him to select a small bonus (say, the optimal behavior for 65%), rather than reap money 
from the firm in the form of a large bonus (say, the optimal behavior for 35%). That is, the 
sum of the share holdings of the executive and the rest of the family should enter in the 
explanation, rather than the holdings of the rest of the family per se, where holdings of 
other family members (brothers, sisters, parents) substitute for executive holdings, both in 
terms of power and in terms of the objective being maximized. 
                                                 
2  Nevertheless, several studies (e.g., Altonji, 1992)  find that individuals are not completely altruistic 
towards family members. 
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H1.2: .Bonus (and salary) and equity holdings of CEO and his family are 
curvilinearly (inverted U-shape) related. 
 Over time, top executives will also accumulate social capital with other incumbent 
executives and directors of the firm, typically starting with small gifts, with the magnitude 
of gifts gradually increasing over time (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964).  Earlier we indicated 
that tenure is associated with increased embeddedness, including more dense social 
exchange relationships with elaborate and diffuse patterns of obligations among the 
members of the top management team, centrality in the communication network, 
institutionalization of governance arrangements that reflect the CEO’s preferences.The top 
executive is also instrumental in screening and hiring new executives and directors, and in 
setting their compensation (Tosi and Gomez-Media, 1989; Wade et al., 1990; Singh and 
Harianto, 1989).  His social surroundings will be particularly prone to mirro his stamp 
when his tenure is comparatively long. Share holdings endow the executive with 
additional, formal power in this respect, and additional opportunities for "gift giving" to 
other executives and directors, with perhaps as the biggest gift, to form some mentor-
protégé relationship that leads to  the latter's promotion into the ranks of senior 
management (compare Kanter, 1977). When the top executive's tenure increases, the 
indebtedness that he creates through his holdings is expected to increase, both towards 
executives that have been there from the start, and even more so towards executives and 
directors nominated after - and by - the executive. From a social exchange perspective, 
this will result in larger return gifts, also in situations where share ownership per se is 
irrelevant, such as in compensation committees.  
 Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) documented a curvilinear relation (inverted U-
shape) between tenure and pay, which in itself is consistent with our power-derived 
interpretation. However, their evidence is also consistent with a life cycle-argument. The 
implication is that tenure interacts with CEO equity holdings in determining the size of 
CEO bonus and salary, with the presumption that tenure is a proxy of covert power. Our 
argument regarding  power in shaping executive pay implies, therefore, that the effect of 
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equity holdings will be moderated by the tenure of the senior executive. The tenure's effect 
may either increase over the whole tenure period (if executives with share holdings 
become more influential and more successful in manipulating their pay), or the effect 
might in fact decline with increased levels of tenure (if the executive eventually becomes a 
figurehead with one or two younger executives emerging as the new and comparatively 
more powerful successor). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The effect of equity holdings on executive pay is contingent upon 
CEO tenure. 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that top executives who were present at the time of 
founding wield more power than can be explained by their tenure and share holdings 
alone. For example, the quote at the beginning of this paper from Smith (1990) suggests 
that founders can still be very powerful, even when relatively small holdings remain. In 
young firms, the social arrangements are still informal and fluid and any one of the top 
management team enjoys some latitude to  build a basis of power. In the extreme case,  
when the CEO is the founder, he enjoys first mover advantages and can maneuver 
subsequent recruits into a position of dependency and mentoring. The CEO as founder is 
therefore likly to have surrounded himself with people who are obligated to him. 
Furthermore, he will probably have expert knowledge of the technology of the business he 
started. The reputation effects of founder confer the undisputed legitimacy to set 
precedents and to shape the norms by which decisions are made.  The CEO as founder is 
therefore likely to control information and implicit knowledge as important sources of 
informal power.  A top executive who inherited share holdings and gradually grew into the 
firm will likely have less power, particularly when the firm matured and became more 
mechanistic. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: In start-ups and comparatively young firms, CEOs are more successful 
in leveraging their holdings to manipulate the size of their bonuses. 
 Top executives may not only derive power from their embeddedness in a network 
of relationships with relatives, directors, executives, suppliers and customers.  They may 
also enjoy superior information on relevant decision issues, including  factors which affect 
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their own performance. Our fourth hypothesis on bonuses bears on such power 
engendering information asymmetries, and how they relate to firm diversity. 
 Various authors have studied the relationship between corporate diversity and 
executive pay. The combined theory and evidence suggests a non-linear relationship. In 
single business firms, the task of the CEO is relatively simple. In that case, he has only 
one unit to supervise, and the strategic question of what business to be in, is less relevant. 
Thus, it is relatively easy for the board to assess CEO performance (Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, 1992). When moving from single business firms to the more 
diversified firms but still remaining within Rumelt's (1974) categories of dominant- and 
related-product firms, the task of top executives becomes more complex. Under such 
ambiguous conditions, there exist more latitude for power plays and payment of side 
payments. The CEO might therefore discover more opportunities for manipulating his pay.  
Particularly with division heads, one would expect more opportunities for corruptive 
practices (Eccles, 1988); the CEO is closely involved in monitoring SBU executives and  
in preserving economies of scope among the portfolio of businesses, to foster spill-over of 
knowledge  and coordination of complementary assets (Lorsch and Allen, 1973; Balkin 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, 1992). Such conditions are absent in highly 
diversified firms, where the task of the top executive becomes less complex again. SBUs 
are relatively autonomous and self-contained. It is not necessary for top executives to 
exploit synergies, and monitoring of SBU executives on synergistic criteria becomes 
moot. Instead, SBU executives are paid based on the performance of their SBU (Berg, 
1969, 1973). Moreover, the pay structure of top executives is relatively formal and based 
more on objective criteria, such as divisional performance (Salter, 1973; Galbraith and 
Nathanson, 1978; Gomez-Mejia, 1992). 
 It is also of interest to note that several studies have take measures of strategic 
diversity as proxies of managerial discretion, and by implication the potential to 
accumulate covert power. A recent paper (Worrell, Nemec and Davidson, 1997) 
considers international diversification and broadening of the client base among 
financial institutions as an indication for discretion, with the assumption that the 
18 
performance-compensation relationship should be stronger among diversified banks. 
In the present paper, however, we assume that CEOs can manipulate their 
compensation package whenever they manage under conditions of high discretion, all 
this due to information benefits they enjoy vis a vis other stakeholders. 
  The combined literature suggests that job complexity for top executives, and the 
concomitant information asymmetry between boards and top executives regarding the 
latter's performance, is largest at intermediate levels of diversity. More information 
asymmetry implies more hidden power for top executives (Aram and Cowen, 1983). Thus, 
we expect top executives with shares in intermediately diversified firms, to be more 
successful in manipulating their pay than executives in firms at either of the extremes, 
where they enjoy diminished discretion. Consistent with our prediction, Napier and Smith 
(1987) found higher bonuses for corporate executives at intermediate levels, but other 
studies (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, 1992) suggested lower bonuses. In fact, the relation between 
diversity and bonuses may be affected by many other factors than power.  For example, if 
information that principals have about the performance of top executives as agents is 
"noisier" at intermediate levels of diversity, agency theory predicts that this leads to lower 
optimal bonuses. Also, if job complexity for top executives is relatively high at 
intermediate levels, and executives have a large impact on firm value (since they have a 
strong power on SBUs and their synergies), a marginal product  interpretation suggests 
higher optimal bonuses. It is difficult to control for these other effects of diversity on 
bonuses when testing our power interpretation. Therefore, we will test an hypothesis that 
more directly bears on the role of power in shaping CEO compensation. Our  
interpretation implies that even if (absolute) bonuses would be lower at medium levels of 
diversity, the magnitude (per dollar) of the bonus due to share holdings is higher than at 
either of the extremes. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: The effect of equity holdings on CEO pay is contingent upon the 
degree of firm diversification, with pay being higher at immediate 
levels of diversification. 
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Finally, it should be pointed out that the above hypotheses stand in sharp conflict 
with the major tenets of agency theory. There is a vast body of research on CEO 
compensation that  disregards the power of the senior executive. Rather, it postulates that 
compensation is a function of corporate performance whenever the remunerative regime 
molds CEO decision making toward the needs of the firm and its owners.  
 Many studies in financial economics have indeed documented a positive 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance (Lewellen and 
Huntsman, 1971; Larcker, 1983; Murphy, 1985, 1986; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, Bettis and Kerr (1985) found no such relation. 
Financial economists maintain that stock market performance is the correct benchmark, 
but empirical studies suggest that accounting performance is more common. For example, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that the firm's stock market performance explains only 
0.008 of the variance of CEO pay (salary and bonus). The addition of accounting 
performance to their model increases the explained variance to 0.045. We expect accoun-
ting performance to be particularly relevant in non-listed firms, where market-derived 
proxies of performance are not available. In line with our earlier remarks, emphasizing 
that salaries are intended to compensate executives for job complexity, and bonuses for 
annual performance, we hypothesize:  
H5: The executive's bonus rather than his salary is tied to the firm's 
accounting based performance indices. 
 
 
Method 
 
Sample   
The data are from a 1985 Dutch sample of top executives, recently made available by 
the HAY Management Consulting Group. Information on ownership, compensation, 
power, and firm attributes came from a survey among randomly selected executives 
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(mostly executive board members) in mid-sized, non-listed firms in a wide variety of 
industries. 
 Issues of non-US type data require us to ask whether the findings are 
idiosyncratic to a particular setting. Since the firms were privately held, they are 
comparatively immune to the market for corporate control. In fact they are 
comparable to US data files on firms with poison pills (Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; 
Ryngaert, 1988), to firms that underwent an LBO (Kaplan 1989; Smith, 1989), and to 
other non-listed firms. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argue that their evidence 
from the leisure industry may be biased due to idiosyncratic labor market conditions 
and ownership structures. The present study reduces this problem by analyzing 
multiple industry data on chemical firms, textiles, construction, electro-technical 
firms, furniture, food, coatings, and so on. 
 For obvious reasons, we only selected independent firms from the HAY 
sample (subsidiaries were omitted). Also, we only selected data on executive board 
members. Finkelstein (1992) argues that the choice of the unit of analysis in research 
on top executives and the issue of executive power are two sides of the same coin. His 
empirical research shows that power in corporations is not restricted to CEOs. This is 
a fortiori true in the Netherlands, where decision making is done collectively rather 
than by a single actor such as the CEO (Hofstede, 1980; Pennings, 1993). Therefore 
we selected data on all executive board members. 
 In terms of firm size, the data set is already homogenous to some degree, since 
the data concern executives of mid-sized firms. Nevertheless, a top executive of a 
firm of, for example, 1000 employees cannot readily be compared to a "top 
executive" of a firm of 10 employees. Therefore, all executives of firms with less than 
50 employees were omitted from the data set. We selected all executive board 
members of the remaining firms (n = 164). Because of missing data, 21 observations 
were removed from the sample, leaving 143 executives. A chi-square analysis showed 
that the omitted cases did not differ significantly from the remaining sample in terms 
of executive characteristics (shareholdings, bonus, salary, tenure) and firm 
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characteristics (sales, employees, diversity). Thus, we do not believe that the 
remaining sample is seriously skewed in the direction of the hypothesis testing. The 
mean sales of the remaining firms were fl. 292 million (one guilder is roughly $ .65), 
and the mean number of employees was 638. Therefore, these firms are somewhat 
smaller than the firms that are generally analyzed in the compensation literature. 
 Finally, it should be pointed out that in the Netherlands the top management 
team and the board of directors are two distinct entities between which there cannot 
be overlapping membership. This strengthens the notion of the board of directors as 
the principal in that its members represent the residual claimants, and the executive 
board as the agent. It also implies that agency and power problems that result from 
having insiders on the board (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1989; Wade et al., 1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992), and in particular, from CEO 
duality (the CEO is also the Chairman, see Boyd, 1994) do not exist in the 
Netherlands. Exhibit A provides a listing of the variables that are used in predicting 
CEO base pay and bonus. 
 
--Exhibit A about here -- 
 
Measures 
BONUS is the total 1984 bonus of the executive, dependent on firm performance, 
individual performance measures, etc. SALARY is the 1984 salary. BONUS and 
SALARY are in Dutch guilders (one guilder is roughly $ 0.65). SHARE is the fracti-
on of shares held by the executive, and SHAREFAM is the fraction of shares held by 
the executive's family (executive, spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters). 
FIRMYEAR is the number of years of firm tenure. MARKETS is the number of 
markets in which the firm was active (as reported by the executive). 
 The HAY data set did not contain direct information on whether the top 
manager was the founder. Instead, the data set contained information regarding the 
age of the firm, measured on an ordinal scale, with scores 1 (<2 years), 2 (2-5 years), 
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3 (5-10 years), 4 (10-25 years) and 5 (>25 years). Category 5, representing firms older 
than 25 years, was the most frequent (79% of firms). We combined this information 
with the firm tenure of the manager. For example, if the manager had had firm tenure 
for 7 years and the variable firm age had any other value than 3 (5-10 years), the 
manager could not possibly be the founder, and his score on the newly created varia-
ble FOUNDER became 0, else 1. Similarly, if he had had firm tenure for 21 years and 
the age of the firm had any other value than 4 (10-25 years), his score on the variable 
FOUNDER became 0, else 1. Clearly, the variable FOUNDER contains some noise. 
All managers with score 0 cannot possibly be founders. All founders will have a score 
of 1. However, some managers with score 1 may not be founders, since having had 
tenure (almost) from the beginning of the firm does not guarantee that the manager 
founded the firm as well. Therefore, the measure will likely contain some noise. Of 
course, noisy measurement is the rule, rather than the exception in empirical research. 
Nevertheless, any effect associated with FOUNDER estimated in this study may 
underestimate the "true" effect associated with being a founder, and any failure to 
reject the null hypothesis (no effect associated with FOUNDER - main effects, or 
interaction terms including this variable) should be interpreted with some care. 
 SALES and EMPLOYEES are the 1984 sales and number of employees (full 
time equivalents) of the firm. Like most previous compensation studies, we used the 
log of these variables. The data set also allowed us to calculate the profit per 
employee for each firm. This variable reflects the ultimate performance measure for 
top executives, whose main task according to agency theory is to screen and possibly 
ratify proposals from lower level executives, and to monitor their performance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The profit per employee may differ across industries, reflecting 
differences in risk and thus in risk premium commanded by suppliers of capital, 
differences in capital intensity, etc. To mitigate potential confounding 
industry-effects, we calculated the deviation of the profit per employee from its 1984 
industry average, divided by the 1984 industry average. This leads to the variable 
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PPE, the percentage that the profit per employee is above or below the industry 
average.  
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations, together with the correlation 
matrix pertaining to the variables used in the testing of hypotheses. The table shows 
that equity holdings do not correlate significantly with salary and bonus. 
 
--please insert table 1 here-- 
 
 
 The questionnaire that was part of HAY's 1985 compensation survey also 
contained a variable that allowed some first insight regarding the power associated 
with the observables in our study. The item was: 
The discretion I have to implement changes or innovations in the firm is, in 
general:....  
 
where managers were requested to score from 1 (very small) up to 7 (very large). 
Note that a recent study (SMJ, 1997) treats “discretion” as an attribute that either 
accentuates and  amplifies or attenuates the performance - compensation relationship. 
The correlations of this item with the variables SHARE and SHAREFAM were 0.27 
(p < 0.01) and 0.22 (p < 0.01), respectively. None of the correlations of the item with 
the variables FIRMYEAR, FOUNDER, and MARKETS were significant in the 
expected direction. The correlations of the item with BONUS and SALARY were 
0.14 (p < 0.10) and 0.07, respectively. Even the significant correlations with this 
simple and general measure of managerial power are quite low, but they form some 
first indication that (c)overt power is related to share holdings (by the manager and 
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his family) and to compensation (in particular, the manager's bonus), rather than to 
the variables FIRMYEAR, FOUNDER, and MARKETS. 
 
 We now continue with testing the hypotheses of this paper. We hypothesized 
that the relationship between equity holdings and compensation are contingent on 
tenure. Previous studies have found mixed results on the relation between tenure and 
pay. Our theory is silent on the precise functional form, in the sense that it does not 
discriminate between power monotonically increasing in tenure, and power first 
increasing and then decreasing. From the perspective of our theory, the precise 
functional form is an empirical matter. To gain more insight in this respect, we 
estimated the following equation for various levels of FIRMYEAR, where ß1 reflects 
the estimated effect of equity holdings on bonus: 
 
BONUS =  ß0 + ß1.SHARE +ß2.SHARE2 + ß3.MARKETS + ß4.FOUNDER + 
ß5.SALES +ß6.EMPLOYEES + ß7.PPE + e 
 
Obviously, the size of the subsets on which this model is estimated must at least equal 
the number of parameters to be estimated. But too small subsets will likely lead to 
wild variations in estimates of ß1, blurring the view on the underlying pattern. 
Nevertheless, we would like as many estimation points as possible to be able to 
identify a pattern at all, e.g.,  to identify inflection points in case of non-linearity. The 
results are plotted in figure 1. The plot is a "moving-average" analogy, where each 
point reflects the estimate of ß1 for the corresponding point on the x-axis and the 
three preceding points, weighted according to the number of observations for each 
point. Thus, an observed increase in the figure in ß1 from xi to xi+1 reflects the 
additional contribution of xi+1 to the estimated sensitivity. This results in a relatively 
fine-grained picture of the trend, while extreme fluctuations are dampened.  
 
--please insert figure 1 about here -- 
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Figure 1 shows a non-linear pattern, with seniority at 20-30 years of tenure showing 
higher bonus pay-outs than  seniority at higher and lower levels. Subsequent 
econometric analysis, using Cook's test, showed that estimates in the 20-30 tenure 
range differed significantly (upwards) from a line fitted through all points in figure 1, 
as did estimates in the > 30 tenure range (downwards). We modeled this pattern in the 
simplest possible way, with a dummy D1, valued 1 if the executive had 20-30 years of 
tenure, and 0 otherwise. Of course, some information is discarded when continuous 
scales are converted into dummy variables. There are more complicated ways to 
model pay-power relationships. However, if the power-effect is sufficiently strong, 
we should find significant effects in our subsequent analysis regardless of whether 
more information could be extracted to expose the relationship. 
 Earlier, we hypothesized a non-linear effect of holdings on CEO pay for 
various levels of diversity. To get more insight in this relationship, we followed a 
similar procedure with respect to the variable MARKETS (of course, now the variable 
MARKETS in model (1) replaced by FIRMYEAR). The result is presented in figure 
2. 
 
-- please insert figure 2 about here -- 
 
Consistent with expectations, visual inspection suggests increased sensitivity of 
bonuses for share holdings for intermediate levels of diversity, in the range of 10-20 
markets. This intuition is further supported by Cook's test, that showed that estimates 
in the 10-20 market range differ significantly (upwards) from a line fitted through all 
points in figure 2, as did estimates in the > 20 tenure range (downwards). 
Analogously, we operationalized this pattern with a dummy D2, valued 1 if the 
number of markets was in the 10-20 range, and 0 otherwise.   
 
Tests of the hypotheses on bonus data 
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Table 2 presents evidence on the hypotheses on bonuses. Model 1 captures the impact 
of the power variables (FOUNDER, D1, D2), size variables (SALES, EMPLOYEES), 
and the observables (FIRMYEAR, MARKETS and PPE). This model will be used as 
a benchmark, to assess the explained variance of other models that also include 
shareholdings. 
 
--please insert table 2 about here-- 
   
 
The most significant effect in column 1 is the effect of PPE (p < 0.001, one-sided 
test). This corroborates H5, that the bonus of executives is tied to the firm's 
accounting performance. The adjusted R2 of this model is 0.064. This is of the same 
order of magnitude as in earlier studies, e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find an 
explained variance of 0.045 (unadjusted) in their model containing accounting 
performance. 
 Model 2 extends this model with the executive's holdings. The evidence 
corroborates the predicted curvilinear relation (inverted U-shape) between bonuses 
and shareholdings (H1.1). The effect associated with SHARE is positive and signifi-
cant (p < 0.05), and the effect associated with SHARE2 is negative and significant (p 
< 0.10). Thus, it seems that, on average, shareholdings are indeed used to manipulate 
top management bonuses. These findings differ from Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1989) who found no support for the predicted curvilinear relation. The adjusted R2 
increases from 0.064 to 0.078. 
 In column 3, the executive's holdings are substituted for family holdings 
(including the executive's holdings). Consistent with H1.2, SHAREFAM has a 
significant positive effect and SHAREFAM2 has a significant negative effect. In fact, 
the effects are more significant than the effects in column 2 regarding the executive's 
holdings. These results differ from Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), who found no 
support for their hypothesis on the impact of the holdings of the family (excluding the 
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executive) on the executive's bonus. As an additional test, we also regressed BONUS 
on (SHARE-SHAREFAM) and (SHARE-SHAREFAM)2, using a formulation very 
similar to Finkelstein and Hambrick's model. We found no support for this model, 
suggesting that the contradictory results in Finkelstein and Hambrick's study on 
family holdings were at least to some extent caused by their model formulation, and 
not (only) by the idiosyncratic nature of their data. 
 Column 4 presents the results regarding our hypotheses on the mechanism of 
the executive's power from shareholdings: through their tenure (H2), level of firm 
diversity (H3), and foundership (H4). All interaction effects have the expected sign 
and are highly significant (p < 0.01). The main effect associated with SHARE 
becomes insignificant. These results strongly corroborate a key notion of this paper, 
that power from share holdings is conditional on whether it is backed up by other 
sources of  covert power. The estimates imply, for example, that an executive with 
average holdings (10%, see table 1) that is also in the 10-20 years of tenure range has 
a bonus that is f 14,499 higher than of other executives. If, in addition, he is employed 
at a firm that is intermediately diversified, the bonus is still f 19,951 higher. These 
amounts are non-trivial in view of the average bonus of f 33,024. The relation 
between bonuses and firm performance (PPE) remains significant. The associate 
coefficient implies, for example, that a top executive in a firm that is twice as 
profitable as the industry average, earns a bonus that is f 18,327 higher. The explained 
variance (adjusted) of this model is 0.142. The inclusion of share holdings (main 
effects and interactions) more than doubles the explained variance, compared to the 
benchmark model that only contained performance.  
 We conducted several tests for robustness of the results. All estimation results 
were reproduced with the PPE measure replaced by PPS, the percentage that the profit 
per sales were above industry average. The results were almost identical to table 2, 
except that the effects from PPS were somewhat less significant (p < 0.05) than the 
effects from PPE (p < 0.001). This is consistent with the agency theory notion that the 
main task of top executives is to enhance the productivity of lower level executives 
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and workers (through screening proposals and monitoring their behavior) as their 
benchmark, rather than profit per sales. Finally, our analysis utilized multiple industry 
data to reduce potentially disturbing industry-effects. In theory, industry specific 
distortions cannot be excluded even in case of multiple industry data (see e.g., 
Rumelt, 1982), and even though we corrected profitability for industry specific 
power. Therefore, we reestimated all models, using BONUS* and SALARY* (the 
deviations of the manager's bonus and salary from the industry average) as indepen-
dent variables, instead of BONUS and SALARY. The estimation results were very 
similar to the results in tables 2 and 3 (if anything, somewhat more supportive).  
 
Tests of the hypotheses on salary data: 
Table 3 presents tests of the hypotheses on salary data. All three coefficients in 
column 1 operationalizing firm complexity, SALES, EMPLOYEES, and d2, have the 
expected sign and are significant. This model explains 0.452 of the variance (adju-
sted) of salary.  If we hold hypothesis 5 to be the “base line” test, it is clear that no 
significant relation is measured with firm performance.  
 
   
--please insert table 3 about here-- 
   
 
 Columns 2 and 3 extend this model with the executive's holdings and family 
holdings. The effects associated with both types of holdings are significant, which further 
corroborates H1.1 and H1.2. Finally, all three interaction effects associated with share 
holdings in column 4 have the expected sign, while 2 out of three are significant. These 
results lend further support to H2-H4. The interaction term associated with intermediate 
levels of diversity is not significant. It seems that executives in such firms get higher 
salaries anyway, due to their higher job complexity (the effect associated with d2 remains 
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significant). Similar tests for robustness, as in the case of bonuses, did not lead to different 
conclusions. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Ownership and control 
This paper adds to the literature on ownership and control by exploring a potential 
paradox associated with top manager share holdings. Classical agency theory 
maintains that incentives are optimal when the manager is the full owner of the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, executives may use the power associated 
with their holdings to shield themselves from hostile takeovers or other disciplinary 
actions of external investors (Morck, Sleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Ser-
vaes, 1989). In theory, executives may use their equity holdings to perpetuate sub-op-
timal levels of skills and effort; maintain a larger staff, office building, company car, 
or jet than is economically efficient; or manipulate their salary and other pay 
elements. Our paper explored whether such political exercise of power does indeed 
occur, focusing on the manager's pay. We analyzed data on non-listed firms, where 
hostile takeovers are unlikely to happen. We found that top managers of these firms 
do indeed use family holdings (owned by themselves or relatives) to manipulate their 
salary and bonus. 
 We also peeked into the black box of power associated with share holdings - 
by injecting proxies of informal power. Our results showed that formal power from 
internal holdings is not sufficient for managers to manipulate their pay. Rather, it is a 
more subtle process, where the power from their holdings depends on their "embed-
dedness" in the firm, i.e., whether they can back up the overt power from their hol-
dings with other more furtive sources of power. We investigated two sources: power 
rooted in social exchange contracts (proxied by whether the manager founded the 
firm, and by his tenure), and power rooted in information asymmetry vs. the board of 
directors (proxied by the degree of diversification of the firm). We hold these 
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conditions to be major opportunities for power creation. They are often hidden behind 
the overt manifestations of power, including formal position of CEO. Being the 
founder, and/or accumulating tenure creates ample opportunities for institutionalizing 
governance practices, establishing communication networks, and solidifying 
exchange relationships. The CEO surrounds himself with people who owe him 
obligations and which become manifest in the way the former can shape decisions 
that protect his personal interest.  Consistent with predictions, we found that top 
managers manipulate their salaries and bonuses, if the formal power from their 
holdings is backed up by these sources of power. 
 Our results do not imply that social exchange contracts per se are bad for 
investors. Managers and directors may develop social exchange contracts over time, 
where directors "give" trust, loyalty, recognition, perhaps even compensation to top 
managers, and managers "give" work effort in return (cf. Homans, 1961, Blau, 1964). 
We might in fact have encountered these beneficial effects in our study. If top mana-
gers are disciplined by social exchange contracts (their strength being proxied by 
foundership and tenure), and if more work effort leads to higher return gifts in the 
form of salaries and bonuses, than tenure, and being a founder.1  However, no signifi-
cant "main" effects of tenure and foundership on bonuses and salaries were found in 
our study. Alternatively, we found strong interaction effects between manager hol-
dings and other sources of power, regarding their salaries and bonuses. This was 
consistent with the theory that top managers use the power rooted in their social 
exchange contracts and in information asymmetry versus the board of directors, to 
magnify the formal power from their holdings, in order to manipulate their bonuses 
and salaries. 
 
                                                 
1.  There is also another story that could have rationalized observed correlations 
between these variables - if directors learn about the manager's ability and effort 
through time (reducing the information asymmetry in this respect) and substitute 
bonuses for salaries in compensating the manager (Murphy, 1986). 
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Compensation schemes from an agency perspective 
The present study, and, in particular hypothesis 5, adds also to the agency literature 
on compensation. These studies - typically analyzing data on top managers of Fortune 
top 500 firms - find significant relationships between top manager bonuses and firm 
performance (e.g., Murphy, 1985; Benston, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Our 
results reveal the same 'stylized fact' for non-listed, relatively small firms, with a wide 
variety in internal ownership. Thus, our study extends the domain of firms for which 
the stylized fact applies. 
  
 The results in this paper are also helpful in rationalizing two other  'stylized 
facts' that are anomalous, or puzzling, for agency theory. Agency theory suggests that 
variable pay and equity holdings are used as complementary sources of pecuniary 
incentives, where their relative importance varies across firms and industries, depen-
ding on relative costs and gains (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). It is puzzling for 
agency researchers that previous empirical studies do not corroborate the predicted 
negative correlation between bonuses and equity holdings (Benston, 1985; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). However, suppose that top managers use their holdings to manipulate 
their pay, rather than that the incentive mix is designed by an omnipotent board of 
directors. Then it is not surprising that the negative relationship between equity 
holdings and bonuses predicted by agency theory is not observed. 
 A second puzzle is as follows. Agency theorists traditionally maintain that 
executive pay is strongly tied to performance, provided executives are bound by a 
well designed compensation plan. However, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that the 
observed relationship between top management pay and performance is too weak to 
be consistent with principal-agent theory (see also Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; 
Weisbach, 1988; Gilson, 1989). Various studies in the management literature, and 
more recently in agency theory, have suggested explanations of why pay is weakly 
tied to performance, including measurement problems, reduction of intrinsic drives 
through external rewards, executives focusing too narrowly on the objectives in their 
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compensation contracts, the absence of external blockholders, and the public outcry 
over large bonuses for top managers (Deci, 1975; Baker et al., 1988; Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992; Baker; 1992; Frey, 1992, 1993; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989, 
1994; Singh and Harianto, 1989; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Based on the results of 
our study, we propose an additional story that can - partially - explain weak pay-
performance relationships: that top managers use their equity holdings to manipulate 
their pay, thus distorting pay-performance relationships. 
 
Compensation and corporate governance 
 Our paper is primarily concerned with the newly emerging tradition in the 
management literature that considers political factors key determinants of executive 
pay (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Wade et al., 1990; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989, 
1994). Previous studies typically compared top management pay in 'externally 
controlled' firms (where external blockholders are present), with 'management 
controlled' firms (where the shares are dispersed among many external parties). Our 
paper complements this research by analyzing the third type of firm distinguished by 
McEachern (1975): 'owner managed' firms. Our study adds to this literature by 
showing that managers use power associated with their equity holdings to manipulate 
their pay, if this power is embedded in other sources of informal power (e.g., tenure or 
information asymmetry).   
 We also found, consistent with earlier studies, that salaries are largely driven 
by job complexity (proxied in this study by the number of employees, firm sales, and 
firm diversity). In addition, we found that top managers use their holdings to 
determine their salaries, although this effect was smaller than the impact of job 
complexity on salary. A related conclusion is that our results generally suggest that 
bonuses and salaries are different from the perspective of the principal -  salaries 
compensate the manager for job complexity, bonuses for performance - but similar 
from the perspective of the receiving manager, that seeks to impact both pay elements 
through his equity holdings. 
33 
 
Suggestions for further research 
Our results showed that top managers use the power from their "residual claims" to 
take a cut from the residue before sharing the remainder with other residual claimants. 
(A parallel conclusion was that when approaching full ownership, the manager's 
propensity to increase his pay diminished). Future studies may provide more insight 
into whether managers use their holdings for other political purposes as well: to main-
tain a larger staff, office building, company car or jet than is economically efficient, 
etc. Future studies may also peek deeper into the black box of internal control through 
internal ownership. Future research on the weaknesses of internal ownership would 
complement existing research emphasizing the strengths of ownership as a control 
system in terms of manager incentives, and the weaknesses of internal control by the 
board of directors (for an overview, see Jensen, 1993). Eventually, this may lead to a 
more balanced view on both the strengths and weaknesses of the two control systems. 
More insight into these weaknesses may also lead to improvements in how internal 
control systems in corporations work, increasing the efficiency of firms, and at a more 
aggregate level, of the economy. 
 A particularly interesting research object in this context is the LBO (see also 
Smith, 1989; Kaplan, 1988, 1989; Jensen, 1993). In theory, LBOs have similar 
benefits as other owner managed firms but may avoid (some of) the efficiency costs. 
A small number of professional investors typically own 60%. Before they participate 
in the buyout, they will likely have screened incumbent management intensively 
(regarding sub-optimal levels of skills, etc.). After the buyout, they engage in intensi-
ve monitoring. Lenders are also motivated to monitor the firm, due to the high debt 
load of the firm and the high probability of bankruptcy. The joint monitoring by 
external blockholders and lenders may keep manager-owners from political "games", 
to serve their own interests at the expense of external parties, at least in the first years 
after the buyout. After some time, the manager-owner may become more entrenched, 
lenders will become less active because the firm has paid off portions of the initial 
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high debt load, and initial investors may have diluted their holdings to cash in on their 
capital gains. In sum: the firm starts to resemble other owner-managed firms. This 
story suggests that LBOs are optimal only temporarily, vis-a-vis control by the board 
of directors, and that LBO firms go back to "normal" again after the restructuring that 
inspired the LBO has been completed. Consistent with this view, Kaplan (1989) finds 
that LBOs typically "survive" 5-7 years before going public again. Future studies may 
provide more insight here. 
 Finally, various writers (Hofstede, 1983; Pennings, 1993) have suggested that 
empirical results on compensation schemes are idiosyncratic to the particular 
institutional and cultural setting of the firms in the data set. This also applies to our 
results from the Dutch setting. We nevertheless found that top management pay was 
tied to performance, a result previously found in studies analyzing data from Anglo-
Saxon settings. This 'stylized fact' consistent with agency theory was replicated 
despite the fact that the (non-listed) firms in our sample were subject to less discipline 
from the market for corporate control than the firms in most previous studies, and 
that, on average, principals in the Netherlands perceive strong pay-for-performance 
relationships as less important than principals in the US (Pennings, 1993). Further-
more, there is no reason to believe that executives in other countries, under similar 
ownership arrangements would not be motivated to manipulate their pay if they have 
the leverage to do so. Obviously more research is required to fully sustain this claim. 
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